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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Federal Labor Union #22703
AFL-CIO
Award
and
Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation
Keyport Plant

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated December 7, 1969 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The Company did not violate the Agreement dated
December 7, 1969 by its action of assigning
Estelle Anderson a departmental seniority date
of November 1, 1962.

. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September /7l971
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this /7.day of September, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the indiv'.dual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0256 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

Federal Labor Union #22703
AFL-CIO

'
'
i
'

and

i

i

Opinion

Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation
Keyport Plant

In accordance with Section VII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated December 7, 1969 between Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation, Keyport Plant, hereinafter referred to
as the "Company," and Federal Labor Union #22703, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
selected as the sole Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Did the Company violate the Agreement dated December
7, 1969 by its action of assigning Estelle Anderson
a departmental seniority date of November 1, 1962?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hazlet, New Jersey on September 1,
1971 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties express-

ly waived the contractual tri-partite Board of Arbitration and
the Arbitrator's oath.
Prior to March 16, 1967, Mrs. Anderson was a member of the
bargaining unit and worked in the Finishing Department0

There-

after, through October 2, 1970 she was in a non-bargaining unit
salaried position.

On October 3, 1970 she was laid off from

- 2 her salaried job, and October 5, 1970 returned

to a bargaining

unit position, again in the Finishing Department.

The Company

calculated her department seniority date, for the purpose of
her return to the Finishing Department bargaining unit, as of
November 1, 1962.

The Company contends that it did so properly

in accordance with Section VI Paragraph 24 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The Union asserts that Paragraph 24 is not applicable because it covers only plant-wide seniority, not departmental
s eniority; that in the alternative, if Paragraph 24 is applicable, Mrs. Anderson's seniority rights were totally vitiated
thereunder because she spent more than two years out of the
bargaining unit.

Instead, the Union argues that the applicable

contract clause is Paragraph 23 of Section VI, and that under
the language of that clause Mrs. Anderson lost her departmental
seniority and her right to return to the Finishing Department
because she failed to affirmatively choose (i.e. give notice)
of her intention to retain her departmental seniority, when
she was transferred to the salaried position.

In short, it is

the Union's argument that Mrs. Anderson could only return to
the bargaining unit as a "new hire" when she was laid off from
the salaried position; and consequently without any accumulated
seniority, she had no right to return to the Finishing Department prior to the recall of others on layoff.
I am unable to accept the Union's contractual theory.
Paragraph 23 Section VI is not applicable because, clearly, it
relates to transfers between bargaining unit departments.

It

covers those situations where an employee is transferred from

- 3 one job to another in different departments covered by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement; and per force those jobs and
departments are within the bargaining unit.

In the instant

case Mrs. Anderson left a bargaining unit job and went to a
non-bargaining unit salaried position not covered by the contract and hence not covered by the language or intent of Paragraph 23.
It is equally clear that Paragraph 24 is the appropriate
contract clause covering the movement of employees from the
bargaining unit to non-bargaining unit jobs and back again to
the bargaining unit.

It speaks expressly of the situation where

"an employee (is) promoted or transferred from a position within the bargaining unit to a position outside the bargaining
unit, who, thereafter, is returned to a position within the
bargaining unit ..."

There can be no serious dispute that that

is the factual situation in the instant case.
Nor can I interpret Paragraph 24 in the manner advanced
by the Union.

I am satisfied that Paragraph 24 was intended

to set forth a formula to measure an affected employee's
departmental as well as plant-wide seniority.
words departmental or plant-wide are used.

Neither the

Instead the pert-

inent language of that clause reads:
The employee shall be credited for seniority purposes.^ Emphasis added).
I am persuaded that the word "seniority," as used above,
encompasses both departmental and plant-wide seniority.

The

history of Paragraph 24 allows for no other conclusion.

In

predecessor contracts Paragraph 24 expressly used the words

- 4departmental and plant-wide in defining the seniority which it
established or measured„

Both words were dropped from the

later version of Paragraph 24, but there is no evidence that
either was dropped in favor of the other„

For the Union to

argue that the present word "seniority" applies only to "plantwide seniority" is to leave unexplained what happened to the
prior inclusion of "departmental" seniority.

The only logical

answer is that the present wording, which uses the sole word
."seniority" was intended to collectively include the previous
references to both departmental and plant-wide seniority.

In

other words, as the paragraph historically and expressly covered both departmental and plant-wide seniority, its later reference to "seniority," absent any evidence of a change in its
historical intention, must embody within the single word both
types of seniority under the contract„
Finally I cannot agree with the Union that Paragraph 24
should be read to vitiate Mrs. Anderson's departmental seniority because she spent more than two years outside the bargaining unit0

It simply does not say that.

Rather it sets forth

how the seniority of such an employee is to be calculated. And
the formula is clear.

The employee receives credit for all

previous service in the bargaining unit (acquired prior to
transfer to the non-bargaining unit job) plus time spent outside the bargaining unit up to a maximum of two years.

Obvious-

ly then, a period of time outside of the bargaining unit in
excess of two years does not cause an affected employee to
lose all his seniority.

Rather that excess period just may

- 5 not be included in calculating the employee's total departmental and plant-wide seniority.

In the instant case the Company

calculated Mrs. Anderson's seniority correctly in accordance
with the formula set forth in Paragraph 24.

It gave her credit

for her previous service in the bargaining unit plus only two
years of service outside of the bargaining unit; (though she
spent more than two years in the non-salaried position.)

Her

seniority date of November 1, 1962 was reached in this manner
and is therefore contractually accurate and sustained.

Eric
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local 259 UAW
1

and

'

Award
and
Opinion

Lichtenberg-Robbins Buick, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Moe
Solotoft? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association
on June 15, 1971 at which time Mr. Solotoff, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses,,
The Company charges the grievant with "dishonesty in employment" within the meaning of Section V of the contract.

It

contends that an automobile which the grievant serviced needed,
among other things, new points and a condenser; that the grievant reported the need for this repair; that he drew new points
and a condenser from the stock room; that he certified on the
work sheet that he installed the new points and condenser; but
that in fact he did not install them though the customer was
charged for that work and the grievant paid for doing it. Obviously if this is sustained the test of just cause for discharge
would be met.
As in many similar matters an answer to the stipulated issue

- 2 narrows to a matter of credibility.

If, as the Company asserts,

the grievant offered conflicting explanations at the time the
Company discovered continuing trouble with the automobile in
question, his story in the arbitration hearing simply cannot be
believed.

Specifically, the Company contends that upon the

failure of the automobile to run properly after repair, and
when confronted by the results of a Company investigation showing either the original points and condenser were left in the
car or had been replaced by a type not used by the Company, the
grievant replied "nobody changes condensers here," and then
first stated that he installed points and a condenser obtained
from his tool box because those he drew from the parts department were defective; but later (the next morning) claimed he
had in fact installed the very points and condenser which he
drew from the parts department.

The latter position is the one

he maintained at the arbitration hearing, and which he says he
maintained throughout the investigation.
Clearly, to uphold the Company's assertion is to find that
the grievant1s inconsistent statements constitute a fatal admission against interest, because there could be no logical conclusion other than that he sought to hide the real facts.
The quantity. of the evidence, namely the testimony of three
Company witnesses, support the Company's version of what the
grievant said at the point of investigation.
testified on his own behalf contrary-wise.

Only the grievant
The question there-

fore is whether the q-aantity of the Company's case is sufficiently credible and thus convincing up to the standard required in

- 3 discharge cases.

I conclude it is.

I find no believable basis in the record to support a conclusion that the three Company witnesses deliberately falsified their testimony.

Though the Union suggests that one of

them testified maliciously because of some incident regarding a
carburetor (unrelated to the facts in the instant dispute) that
suggestion is much too vague to support a claim of either bias
or malicious falsification; and even if used to discount that
testimony it in no way diminishes the corroborating testimony
of the other two.
Significantly and finally, any real doubt on the question
of credibility must be resolved presumptively in favor of the
Company because of the grievant's prior record at two prior employers.

Though prior similar offenses do not in and of them-

selves prove a subsequent similar charge, an employee's employment history, especially where he has had similar past difficulties, is highly relevant in determining sharp issues of
credibility.

This is well settled both in the courts and in

arbitration.

The grievant concedes that he was disciplined by

two prior employers for offenses similar to the Company;s
charge in the instant case.
The Union argues that for the grievant to have committed
that type of offense again would be senseless because a small
amount of monetary value was involved.

Yet, because many

offenses or misconducts are objectively senseless - yet committed - the senselessness or irrationality of an act of misconduct
is simply not a convincing ground upon which to judge that the
offense did not take place.

- 4 If the grievant did not commit the offense herein charged merely because it was "senseless" he would not have engaged in similar senseless acts at previous places of employment - yet he
did, by his own admission.
The totality of the evidence, the consistent testimony of
the three Company witnesses as to what the grievant said at or
shortly after the time of the incident, viewed against the backdrop of the grievant's conceded similar difficulties at two prior
places of employment, lead me to resolve the pivotal question of
credibility in favor of the Company.
Therefore the Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly
sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of Moe
Solotoff. The reason for his discharge does
not entitle him to five days notice under
Section V of the contract.

Eric /7 Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 22, 1971
STATE OF New York )sg
COUNTY OF New York) * "
On this 22nd day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0436 71

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702 Welfare Fund; Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians Union,
Local 702 Pension Fund
AWARD
and

Manchester Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Agreement
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named Funds; and the above named
Employer having failed to appear at the hearing after due notice,
makes the following AWARD:
For the period February through September, 1971
Manchester Laboratories, Inc. owes the above named
Pension Fund the sum of $11,251.79.
For the period May through September 1971 Manchester
Laboratories, Inc. owes the above named Welfare Fund
the sum of $3519.84.
These sums are past due. Therefore Manchester Laboratories, Inc. is directed to pay said sums to the
respective Funds with interest forthwith.
Manchester Laboratories shall also reimburse the
Funds jointly in the amount of $150.00 representing
the Arbitrator's fee for services.

Eric J / S c h m e r t z
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: November 1, 1971
STATE OF New York
)ss.:
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this 1st day of November, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, WHim PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES IKBGSTEY

la the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702 Welfare Fund; Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians Union,
Local 702 Pension Fund
AUARO
and
Manchester Laboratories, Inc.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Agreement
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named Funds; and the above named
Employer having failed to appear at the hearing after due notice,
makes the following AWARBs
for the period February through September* If71
Manchester Laboratories, Inc. owes the above named
Pension Fund the sum of $11,231*79*
For the period May through September 1971 Manchester
Laboratories, Xne, owes the above named Welfare Fund
the sum of $3519.!

these sums are past due. therefore Manchester Laboratories, Inc. is directed to pay said sums to the
respective Funds with interest forthwith.
Manchester Laboratories shall also reimburse the
Funds jointly in the amount of $150.00 representing
the Arbitrator*s fee.for services.

Eric J. Schmert*
Permanent Arbitrator
BATED? Hoveaber 1, 1971
STATE m New fork
)ss. 2
OF Saw fork
)
On this 1st day of Hovesaber, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schtaart* to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he ex*
ecuted the same.

AMERICAN AEBIfRAfION ASSOCIAtlOU,

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
National Union of Hospital and
Nursing Hoone Employees Division of
RWBStJ, Local 1199*1, AFL-CI0

Award

and
Maryland Oaaaral Hospital
Hie Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated January 1, If70 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows t
there was just cause for the discharge of Hilda Spenee.

Irie x Setoert«
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
National Union of Hospital and
Nursing Home Employees Division
of RWDSU, Local 1199-E, AFL-CIQ

Opinion

and
Maryland General Hospital
In accordance with Article 13 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 1, 1970 between Maryland General
Hospital, hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital," and the
National Union of Hospital and Nursing Home Employees Division
of RWDSG Local 1199-E, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Hilda
Spenee? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Baltimore» Maryland on July 22, 1971
at which tiae Mrs. Spenee, hereinafter referred to as the "griev*
ant," and representatives of the Union and Hospital, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses, the parties expressly waived the
Arbitrator's oath.
The grievant, a Nursing Aide, was discharged on April 5,
1971 because of a record of excessive absenteeism. She received
warnings about that record on September 4, 1966, July 2, 1967,
July 19 and December 17, 1970, and a Reprimand on February 22,
1971.

. 2 -

The excessive nature of the grlevant's absentee record is
not disputed by the Union and hence need not be recited in detail. Instead the Union asserts that the penalty of discharge
was too severe, It advances what it considers to be certain
mitigating circumstances, together with a contention that the
Hospital erred procedural!? in imposing the penalty of discharge
By way of mitigation, the grievant and th« Union on her
behalf contend that the. record of absenteeism during 1970 and
until April, 1971 were due to circumstances beyond the grievf

ant*s fault or control, namely because of certain medical problems in general and other physical conditions resulting from an
automobile accident. Also it argues that because the grievant'
attendance record improved during the year 1969, when she received no warning no ties*, the ..prior years of 19(16, 1%7 and
lf&$ should not be held against her. And therefore her attendance record should not have been deemed cumulatively unsatisfactory. Procedurally, the Union points to the fact that the
Hospital gave the grievant a Reprimand on February 22, 1971
after the warning of December 17, 1970 when that warning expressly statedi

"this is the final warning, the next offense

will mean termination," the Union asserts that the Hospital
failed to do what it said it would do following the warning of
December 17, 1970; that to reprimand the grievant rather than
discharge her when her attendance record did not improve, constituted a waiver of the Hospital's right to impose the penalty of discharge thereafter* .
Certain rules are so well settled that they hardly need

to be repeated here. One is that excessive absenteeism, regardless of the reason, is grounds for disciplinary action. And,
where that record of absenteeism persists following lesser disciplinary penalties, the offending employee may be discharged
even if his absences are due to conditions or circumstances beyond his fault or control. Though there may be illogical aspects to those rules (namely the imposition of rehabilitative
disciplinary measures under circumstances where the employee is
unable to improve because of illness or physical disabilities
.1*

beyond his control) the rules are nonetheless universally accepted, simply because an employer, to effectively operate his business or institution, has the right to expect prompt and regular attendance from his employees. Clearly, this is true in a
hospital where absenteeism may have a bearing* on patient care
and imposes additional burdens not only on the employer, but on
other employees who must take up the slack.
Accordingly, in the application of this well recognised
rule, the grlevant's poor attendance record during the last
year and a half of her employment even if due to medical and
physical conditions beyound her fault and control, cannot be
excused by the Arbitrator. It is for the Hospital, not the
Arbitrator, to decide whether those circumstances may be considered in mitigation» and in this case the Hospital has chosen
not to do so,
I am unable to conclude that the grievant's improved attend!*
ance reeord during 1969 vitiates either her poor reeord between
1966 and If48 or her subsequent unsatisfactory record of 1970-

«. 4 *

1971, fhe contract does not provide for the removal of warning
notices after passage of a subsequent satisfactory period. More
important however, the consecutive years 1966 through It68 are
not sufficiently far removed frost her poor attendance record of
If70 and If71 to render the former immaterial* an the contrary,
considering the proximity of the years invoved, it is logical
to conclude that 1969 was an exception to her general pattern of
poor attendance (represented by the years IM6 through 196$ and
again in If70 and 1971), And considering the extent of her ab*

senteeism during the latter year and a half, and the acknowledge
reasons which appear in large part to be chronic in nature with*
out any real indication of improvement (i.e.her allergic rashes
and periodic leg and back disabilities), I cannot find unreason*
able the Hospital's conclusion that the grievant's attendance
record would continue unsatisfactory.
Hence, though no doubt she is entitled to commendation for
improving her record during 1969, and I mm sure she made a sin*
cere effort to do so, 1 cannot accept the Union's argument that
her improved record in that single year should be weighed so
much in her favor as to overturn the discharge following a resumption, for almost a year and a half of her pattern of poor
attendance.
Hor can I find anything about the Hospital's procedure in
this case to be fatal to the propriety of the discharge. The
Baployee Handbook, promulgated by the Hospital and admittedly
disseminated aaongst the employees including the grievant, sets
forth the Official Rulee of Conduct for Employees of Maryland

- 3*
General Hospital, none of which the Union protested as unfair
and unreasonable. The Rules expressly provide that "chronic or
habitual absenteeism" is "cause for suspension and/or discharge."
Here the Hospital followed a reasonable rule of "progressive discipline" by warning the grievant four times and reprimanding her
one® before imp so ing the pgaalty of discharge., Obviously the
Hospital did not act precipitously*

It accorded the grievant

notices that her attendance record vas unsatisfactory and gave
her ample opportunity to improve, if she could, before tertainattf

ing her. That the Hospital did not suspend her before discharge
cannot be construed as an error because the undisputed rules provide for suspension or discharge in the alternative. The latter
need not be preceded by the former in a chain of disciplinary
penalties.
Finally X do not see how an issuance of the Reprimand in
February, 1971, after a "final i*arninsfl in Ueeeaber, 1970 can
be deemed prejudicial to the Hospital** ease, Irrespective of
whether or not internal Hospital procedures (set forth in the
Supervisor's Manual) prescribes the issuance of a Reprimand after
a final warning, as a more severe penalty, the Reprimand did
nothing more than again notify the grievant that her attendance
record had not improved; that the Hospital continued to view
it as unsatisfactory; and to give her a short reprieve - indeed
some gratuitous additional time to do better. I am not persuaded that by doing so the Hospital either lost, waived, or abandoned its right to imposing the final penalty of discharge if her
attendance record failed to iiaprove. Therefore, when thereafter

, 6she continued to absent herself from work beyomd a reasonable
number of times, the Hospital properly latpoaed th* peitalty of
discharge.

Arbitrator

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXI CAB INDUSTRY
r

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO

i
i
i
,
i
1

and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of certain Members

i
i
i
?

AWARDS

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, makes the following AWARDS:
, The grievance of Isidore Cook against Sandan Management Corp. was settled during the hearings. Mr.' Cook
was paid the sum of $101.55 for 8 days lost, based on
average earnings. His discharge is expunged from his
employment record. He is not at any time to return
to the employ of this Company. This represents full
settlement of Mr. Cook's grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement but has no bearing on any
pending court litigation between Mr. Cook and the Company, its personnel either corporate or individually.
The grievance of James DiBlasi against Dover Garage
for pro rata vacation pay for 1969-1970 is denied.
I do not find that Mr. DiBlasi was subjected to harassment within the meaning of Article XII Section 3
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The grievance of Al Sysler against Cordi Garage is
granted. I hold that the private agreement entered
into on December 2, 1969 between the Company and Mr.
Sysler in which he agreed to return to work "as a
new driver" and "waived all rights and benefits from
previous employment" is unenforceable. It is well
settled that private agreements between the employers
and individual employees, which are inconsistent with
or waive rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, are invalid, unless expressly affirmed or agreed
to by the Union or a Union representative with authority to negotiate contractual changes or exceptions.
Otherwise the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement affecting the covered employees are preeminent. In
this case I do not find that the written statement of
December 2, 1969 met the test of validity. Therefore
when Mr. Sysler returned to work on December 4, 1969
he retained and resumed all rights which he had previous-

- 2 ly accrued. Accordingly the Company shall pay him
for a second week of vacation for the year 19681969 and for two weeks vacation for 1969-1970.
The discharge of Morris Chemick by Ike Garage is
reduced to a disciplinary suspension. I am not
persuaded that the unusual numbers of time that
Mr. Chemick pulled in to the garage before the
prescribed quitting time was due to an illness so
severe as to make it either impossible or injurious to him to stay out the full shift. I have
previously held that except for offenses warranting immediate dismissal, the Employers of this
Industry should follow the traditional rule of
progressive discipline - namely warning, suspension and then discharge if the improper conduct
continues. Here the grievant was warned but not
suspended. His earlier suspension, in a different
job classification, for an entirely different
offense, and which predated the warning for "pulling in early," cannot be deemed as a suspension with
in the meaning of the progressive discipline rule.
Therefore Mr. Chemick shall be reinstated but without back pay and the period between the discharge
and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary
suspension.
The grievances of Harry Blitzer against Ike Garage
and Fabian A. Benitez against Checker Garage w^ere
withdrawn.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 1, 1971
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 1st day of November, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Pension Fund;
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare
Fund
and

AWARD

Essex Maintenance Corp;
Jaycee Service Corp;
Meter Operating Corp.
The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties at
hearings attended by representatives of the above named Funds
and each above named Employer, renders the following AWARD:
For the period November 1, 1970 through February
28, 1971, Essex Maintenance Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund the sum of $6262.21.
For the period November 1, 1970 through February
28, 1971 Essex Maintenance Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund the sum of
$14,611.84.
The above sums owed are past due. Accordingly
Essex Maintenance Corp. is directed to pay the
above sums to said Funds forthwith with interest.
For the period November 1, 1970 through March 1,
1971 Jaycee Service Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund the sum of $6214.47.
For the period November 1, 1970 through March 1,
1971 Jaycee Service Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund the sum of $14,500.43.
The above sums are past due. Accordingly Jaycee
Service Corp. is directed to pay the above sums to
said Funds forthwith with interest„

- 2For the period December 1, 1970 through February 28,
1971 Meter Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry
Pension Fund the sum of $3396.50.
For the period December 1, 1970 through February 28,
1971 Meter Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry
Health & Welfare Fund the sum of $7925.15
The above sums are past due. Accordingly Meter
Operating Corp. is directed to pay the above sums to
said Funds forthwith with interest.

Eric f. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May
1971
STATE OF New York )__
,
oJ • »
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Pension Fund;
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund
Award
and
Mobile Transit System, Inc,

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties
at a hearing on September 13, 1971 at which representatives of
the parties appeared, makes the following Award;
For the month of February, 1971 Mobile Transit
System, Inc. owes the Taxicab Industry Pension
Fund the sum of $1,243.77.
For the month of February, 1971 Mobile Transit
System, Inc. owes the Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund the sum of $2,950.28
For March 1, 1971 Mobile Transit System,Inc. owes
the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund the sum of $42.00
For March 1, 1971 Mobile Transit System, Inc. owes
the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund the sum
of $98.00.
Mobile Transit System, Inc. has failed to make the above
payments which are past due.

Therefore Mobile Transit System,

Inc. is directed to make said payments in the amounts set forth
above, to said Funds forthwith with interest.

Eric J^ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: September /Jl97I
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of September, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same .

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Local 8-3660, Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union

- and -

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 70-343

National Lead Company, Titanium
Pigment Division

In accordance with Article XIII of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated February 1, 1970 between Local 8-3660,
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union" and National Lead Company, Titanium
Pigment Division, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", the
Undersigned was selected as the sole arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of Grievance
No. 70-77 dated October 18, 1970?
A hearing was held at the Company plant on April 15,
1971, at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "Parties" appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the
contract provision for a tri-partite Board of Arbitration.

The

parties filed post-hearing briefs.
I do not reach the merits of the grievance.

Rather,

based on the record before me I am compelled to conclude that

-2the Union agreed to and accepted the plan which later gave rise
to the grievance, both before and during its implementation by
the Company, and that therefore the Union waived any substantive
rights it may have had to subsequently complain.
Specifically, it is clear and uncontroverted that the
Company discussed its plans to combine certain jobs and the
proposed resultant manning with the Union at several meetings
before the plan was put into effect; that the Union at those
meetings suggested changes and written explanations, with which
the Company complied; that the detailed manner of application
of the plans to affected employees was jointly worked out; and
following implementation, specific Union objections including
its demand that the manning crew in a particular department be
increased as the condition for "settlement of the problem,"
were all agreed to and undertaken by the Company.
In short, by any traditional standard, the Company's
action was not unilaterally promulgated, but rather bilaterally
negotiated with the Union, with considerations given each to the
other for acceptance.

No other logical conclusion is possible

from the unrefuted testimony of Company witnesses on pages
64 thru 90 of the transcript of the hearing.
It is immaterial that subsequent to the implementation
of the program, the Union grieved and did not withdraw its
grievance.

That procedural step in no way restored the Union's

right to substantive relief. For in agreeing to the Company's

-3program (as revised by Union demands), the Union abandoned any
right it may have had to later complain when what was agreed upon
was put into effect.
Accordingly the Undersigned Arbitrator, having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, makes the
following AWARD.

Grievance No. 70-77 dated October 18, 1970
is denied.

Eric *J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July 7, 1971
STATE OF New York
)ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 7th day of July, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Mattef of the Arbitration between
ifc*
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CASE NUMBER:

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR
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UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S), having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
jfcU^f J., 1V70
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS as follows:
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DATED: *«
STATE OF
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COUNTY OF

ss.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
The New Rochelle Federation of Teachers,
Local 280, AFT, AFL-CIO
-and-

'
i
'
'
"
'

OPINION OF
ARBITRATOR

City School District, City of New Rochelle1
i

The stipulated issue is:
Has the School District violated the
contract by not making sabbatical
appointments for the 1971-1972 school
year? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the New Rochelle City Hall on
June 24, 1971 at which time representatives of the above named
parties, hereandafter referred to respectively as the "Federation" and the "District", appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

I find that on its face the critical language of
Article X, Section B8 of the contract is ambiguous.

It is

subject, with equal logic, to the sharply different interpretations advanced by the District and the Federation.

It can be

construed as placing the granting of sabbatical leaves within
the discretionary authority of the District.

If so, Title D,

Section 1, Article V of the Civil Service Law is applicable and
preeminent, and the leaves would be prohibited.

But it can be

-2-

^
interpreted just as persuasively to mandatorily
require the
District to grant sabbaticals, or at least those of the type
involved herein, to the teachers eligible under the conditions
set forth.

If so there is then an enforceable contract right

to sabbatical leaves which was in existence prior to the
effective date of the amended Civil Service Law, and that Law
(i.e. Title D, Section 1, Article V), by its own terms is inapplicable, and the sabbaticals must be granted.
The pertinent part of the first paragraph of Section
B8, upon which the District relies, reads:
"Sabbatical leaves may be granted to tenured
teachers upon the recommendation of the
Superintendent subject to the following conditions and limitations" (underscoring supplied).
Traditionally the word "may" is permissive and the
sentence therefore could support the District's claim of
discretionary authority regarding sabbaticals.
does not stand alone.

But that sentence

A later introductory sentence to

sabbatical leaves of Types 1, 2 and 3 uses the mandatory word
"shall", reading:
"Sabbatical leaves shall be granted on the
following basis" (underscoring supplied).
The first quoted sentence above can be interpreted
to apply to all that follows thereafter, or in other words
only if the District decides to grant sabbaticals must the
contractual provisions that follow under Section B8 be
mandatorily adhered to in determining which teachers are eligible.

-3Such an interpretation is of course supportive of the District's
position in this case.
On the other hand a different interpretation is
equally sound in my judgement.

Sabbaticals of Types 1, 2 and 3

may be deemed as mandatory if the stipulated conditions are met,
by virtue of their introductory sentence that they "shall be
granted".

The Type 4 sabbatical, by the terms of its own

contract paragraph is undisputedly within the discretion of
the Superintendent (an express discretionary authority not
found in the paragraphs covering Types 1, 2 and 3).

If the first

sentence of Section B8, which uses the word "may" is designed
to cover all four types of sabbaticals and sets up the conditions
of sub-paragraphs a, and b. as threshhold requirements for all
four sabbaticals, it is then apparent why the word "may" was
used.

For in order to encompass the mix of four types of

sabbaticals, three of which are mandatory (Types 1, 2 and 3),
and one of which is discretionary with the District (Type 4),
only a permissive introductory word could be used. What is
controlling therefore is the later and more specific contract
language, which mandates sabbaticals of Types 1, 2 and 3, and
places discretion in the hands of the Superintendent only with
regard to Type 4. As there are no Type 4 applicants involved in
this case, this latter interpretation favors the Federation's
claim that the sabbaticals sought are an enforceable contract
right.

-4The well settled approach in such a circumstance is
for the Arbitrator to look to past practice and to what took
place at negotiations to determine what the parties intended
the contract language to mean.
Without exception the practice each year of the
contractual relationship (for the last seven years up to the
instant dispute) has been to grant sabbatical leaves.

Four

years ago when, as this year, the District faced a comparable
financial crisis, it laid off a substantial number of tenured
and probationary teachers but yet granted sabbaticals.

I

conclude that by not curtailing or denying sabbaticals then,
when such a step was an obvious method of saving money, and
when the contract language of the disputed clause was even more
favorable to the District's present position, the District must
have considered the sabbatical program to be a contract
obligation, rather than discretionary.
Also in the negotiations of the present contract it
is the uncontroverted testimony of the Federation that the
critical language was called to the District's attention; that
the Federation expressly stated that it deemed the language to
be mandatory provided the eligibility conditions were met; and
that the District representative answered in a manner that
reasonably led the Federation to believe that while the District
did not wish to change the language, it recognized and agreed
with the Federation's interpretation.
In short, by practice and express discussion at negotiations I am constrained to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
Federation's interpretation.

Therefore the disputed sabbatical

-5leaves involved in the instant case are an enforceable contract
right to which the eligible teachers are contractually entitled.
Bound by the terms of the contract, the Arbitrator
has no authority to excuse the District from that obligation,
no matter how meritorious the District's case on its budget
crisis may be, and no matter how sympathetic with that problem
this Arbitrator may be.
Accordingly the District shall forthwith promulgate
the sabbatical list; notify the eligible teachers involved and
grant them their sabbatical leaves of absence pursuant to
Article X, Section B8 of the contract.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

.
.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Newark Morning Ledger Co.
and
Newark Printing Pressmen's Union
Local #8

'
'
t
'
i
'

Award

'
'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:

The discharges of Gerald Abramson and David West
on the night shift commencing April 7, 1971 are
sustained.

Eric /). Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August^fl971
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY 0? New York)
On this Mr day of August, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Newark Morning Ledger Co.

'

and

!

Newark Printing Pressmen's Union
Local #8

Opinion

'
'

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the discharges of Gerald Abramson
and David West on the night shift commencing
April 7, 1971 should be sustained?
Hearings were held at the offices of the Publisher on
April 8 and May 6, 1971 at which time Messrs. Abramson and
West, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants," and representatives of the above named Publisher and Union, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was express-

ly waived, and the parties filed post hearing briefs.
After a thorough review of the entire record before me
I am satisfied that my decision can be rendered without an
elaborate Opinion.
There is no question that on the night shift involved,
the grievants consciously disregarded and declined to carry
out the new instructions and orders of the acting foreman relating to the "button man" work assignment and the procedure
for his periodic relief.

Instead the grievants performed the

work and relief in the same manner as on previous nights, contrary to the instructions of the acting foreman on the night
involved.

It is conceded that the acting foreman's new in-

- 2 struetions and orders were effectively communicated to the
grievants and to the Union prior to the grievants' failure and
declination to comply.
Unless the grievants can be excused on the basis of either
or both of the defenses raised on their behalf, the Publisher
would be correct in its characterization of this case as a
"garden variety case of insubordination...." in violation of
the Pressroom Office Rules; and the discharges \\rould be justified.
The grievants and the Union on their behalf rely on two
defenses, namely that they had the right to disregard and decline to carry out the acting foreman's new instructions because of (1) the "status quo" clause of the contract and (2) because compliance with those orders and instructions would jeopardize their health (a well settled exception to insubordination).
During my now expired tenure as Impartial Chairman under
the contract between the parties, I repeatedly stated in official rulings and Awards in prior cases that employees are required to comply with orders and instructions of supervision; to
perform the work assigned; and thereafter to use the grievance
and arbitration procedures of the contract if the propriety of
those orders, instructions and assignments are challenged. Those
rulings and Awards were consistent not only with general well
established principles of industrial relations, but with the
specific Pressroom Office Rules which I previously held to be
reasonable, valid and effectively disseminated amongst the employees and the Union, and binding on them.

So at the outset

- 3 of the shift on the night of April 7, the Union and the grievants knew or should have known the views of this Impartial Chairman regarding the primacy of the foreman's orders and the
effectiveness of the Office Rules.

The introductory paragraph

of those Rules states that "the orders and instructions of foreman and assistant foreman shall be obeyed at all times," and
Rule #21 reads "Insubordination

is cause for immediate dismissal."

I call attention to the significant fact that reliance on
the "status quo" clause was not among the Union's defenses in
those prior cases in which ray rulings and Awards on this point
were made.

Objections or disagreements by the Union with those

rulings and Awards were not then or since based on the contratual "status quo" provision.
In my viexv, considering all that transpired during my tenure as Impartial Chairman, and particularly the circumstances
of the cases and the positions of the parties in connection with
my prior rulings and Awards, I deem it too late for the Union
to now attempt to rely on an interpretation of the "status quo"
clause which, if adopted, would totally negate those prior rulings and decisions.

I was then and remain convinced of the con-

tractual correctness of those rulings and Awards.

Irrespective

of how the "status quo" clause might be interpreted in a situation of "novel impression" I must conclude that with regard to
the duty of an employee to comply with the orders of the foreman, subject to the right to thereafter grieve, my prior rtalings
and Awards set the course of conduct the parties were to follow
and are therefore preeminent, at least through this case.

- 4And even if there be disagreement with this latter conclusion, the legitimacy of that disagreement is laid to rest
by the results of top level discussions between the parties at
Bal Harbor, Florida, prior to the final execution of the current agreement of the contract,

I am persuaded that at that

meeting the authorized representatives of the parties agreed
that the orders of the foreman would be carried out despite
disputes or disagreements over their propriety, leaving any
challenge to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
contract.
point.

The Bal Harbor meeting dealt

especially with this

The reasons for doing so were not academic.

Historic-

ally the parties had had difficulties regarding the procedures
to be followed when employees and supervision disagreed on the
propriety of an order, instruction or work assignment promulgated by the foreman or acting foreman.

Work stoppages, dis-

charges and other disciplinary action grew out of this basic
dispute, and the Bal Harbor meeting was particularly designed
to work out an acceptable understanding.

The evidence shows

that the Publisher obtained the Union's agreement to a procedure and course of conduct consistent with the Publisher's position in this case, and consistent with my prior rulings and
Awards.

Therefore even assuming some merit to a disagreement

with my view that on this question my prior rulings and Awards
are preemptive, the Bal Harbor conference achieved the same result.

In short, irrespective of any interpretation of the

"status quo" clause, by agreeing to comply with the orders of
supervision subject to a subsequent grievance, the Union effect-

- 5 ively waived any right it may have had to invoke the "status
quo" clause as a defence to a charge of insubordination, and
accepted the prior rulings and Awards on this subject.
Appropriately and therefore fortunately (because of the
expiration of my term as Impartial Chairman) I need not, in a
"lame duck" capacity, interpret the "status quo" clause under
the facts in this case.

Consequently and again appropriately

and fortunately neither the parties nor the new Impartial Chairman will be "burdened" by any such ruling which might have a
prospective effect.

Properly I leave the interpretation of

the "status quo" clause to my successor if and when a case
involving that issue arises before him.
Remaining is the Union's second defense - that the grievants had the right to disregard the orders and instructions
because to carry them out would have seriously jeopardized
their health.

The Union has not proved its case on this point.

The only medical testimony in the record is that of a physician
who testified in support of the Publisher's contention that the
paper dust in the "button" area was not injurious to the health
of the button operator.

Though inconclusive in many respects,

his testimony was neither so frail nor impeached as to support
the Union's claim that the paper dust was_ a health hazard. Important however, is that the Union's "health case" is based on
a contention that paper dust if injurious cumula.tivejLy_j3ver_ _a_
period of years.

Assuming arguendo the accuracy of that con-

tention, I do not find it determinative under the instant set
of facts.

The question here is not whether either or both of

the grievants would have been exposed to the paper dust for an

- 6 extended number of years or even months or weeks.

Rather it is

simply whether exposure on the night in question was immediately
injurious to their health.

Frankly I doubt that exposure on a

single night or even over a series of nights during which a
grievance could have been expeditiously processed and an arbitration Award promptly rendered if necessary, would constitute
an immediate health hazard within the meaning of the exception
to the rule on insubordination.

Obviously I make no judgment

on whether exposure over a series of years is injurious to an
employee's health.

I find that no natter what that answer be,

exposure on the night involved or over the short period required to test the merits of the situation in the grievance procedure was not proved to be a condition injurious to their health.
Accordingly, absent acceptance of either defense advanced
by the Union the grievants1 conscious failure to carry out and
respond to the express orders and instructions communicated to
them by their acting foreman regarding the handling of the
"button man" work assignment on the night shift of April 7, 1971
was a contract and work rule violation carrying a proper penalty of discharge.

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 812 Soft Drink Workers Union,
IBT.
and

Award

Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling
Company, Inc.
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 1, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
1. Ivanhoe Gadpaille shall be paid for April 23
and April 24, 1971.
2. The discharge of Joseph H. Yates was proper.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September 3, 1971
STATE OF New York ),ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this third day of September, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. A71-1163

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 812 Soft Drink Workers Union,
IBT.
and
Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling
Company, Inc.

'
'
?
'
'
'
'
i
'
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated June 1, 1968 between Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan
Bottling Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and Local 812 Soft Drink Workers Union, IBT., hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. Is Ivanhoe Gadpaille entitled to pay for April 23
and April 24, 1971?
2. Was Joseph H0 Yates properly discharged under the
terms of the contract? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on August 25, 1971 at which time Messrs. Gadpaille and Yates, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant(s)"
and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties express-

ly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
Grievance of Ivanhoe Gadpaille
The grievant was denied the opportunity to work on April 23
and April 24, 1971 because he failed to "clear through the Com-

- 2 pany's medical department" when he returned to work at the beginning of his shift at 5 P.M. on April 23 following two days
out of work due to an injury.
The Company contends that on April 21 when the grievant
left work because of the injury he was told by his foreman "to
be sure to see the Company nurse before he returned to work,"
and that this requirement is a well established Company rule,
well known to the employees.
The grievant denies any knowledge of any such rule prior
to his attempt to return to work on April 23.

He disputes the

foreman's statement that he was told to see the Company nurse
before reporting back to work.

He states that the first he

learned of any such requirement was shortly before 5 P.M0 on
April 23 when he was asked by his foreman if he had been authorized to return to work by the Company's medical office.

He

then went to that office, but because it was at or shortly after
5 P.M., it was closed.

As that was Friday evening the next

opportunity to see the Company nurse was not until April 26,
which he did; following which he returned to work.
It is conceded that the Company's rule requiring a visit
to its nurse or medical department before returning to work under the circumstance in the instant case has never been promulgated in writing, posted or disseminated in written form amongst
the employees.

It seems to me that such a rule, with such im-

port, especially when it may deprive an employee of the chance
to return to work after recovery from an injury sustained in
the plant, should be in written form and posted or otherwise
». distributed to the employees.

- 3 This case is a good example of why that should have been
done.

A written and well disseminated rule leaves no doubt as

to its existence and hence no question as to its applicability.
Had the Company done so, there would be no question in my mind
that the grievant knew or should have known of it and he and
the Union would have been bound, because such a rule in my
judgment is substantively reasonable„
But because the rule was not promulgated in writing, nor
posted, nor communicated in written form to the employees, I
cannot conclude, in view of the sharply conflicting testimony,
that the grievant knew of it or should have known of it. Even
if hisforeman did tell him on April 21 to "see the nurse" before returning to work, the foreman did not make it clear that
his return to work was conditional on the visit to the nurse„
Also the Company's testimony that it has told other employees
similarly situated to clear through the medical department before reporting back on the job, suggests to me that the Company's policy in this regard is neither well established nor
well known by the employees.

For if it was, such statements

each time would be redundant and unnecessary.

Again it points

up the manner by which a well disseminated written rule eliminates both uncertainty and the need for oral reminder whenever an applicable situation arises.
Accordingly I find that the Company has not met its burden
of showing the well established and well known nature of the
rule upon which it relies.

Failing to promulgate that rule in

the traditional manner, (i.e. in writing,) leaves significant
doubt as to whether the grievant knew of it or was told about

- 4 it prior to April 23; and I give him the benefit of that doubt.
Therefore the Company is directed to pay the grievant at
his regular rate of pay for April 23 and April 24, 1971.

Grievance of Joseph H. Yates
Contrasted with the foregoing grievance this issue involves, '
in part at least, a Company rule which was promulgated in writing and posted in the plant.

That rule reads:

Any employee who has to leave the premises for
any reason must report to his supervisor and
request his permission.
The evidence discloses that the grievant breached this rule.
On May 12, 1971, without permission and during a break period,
the grievant left the Company plant and went to a nearby fire
house admittedly to report what he considered to be a fire violation in the plant.

Also, earlier during his shift and during

his regular working time, instead of returning to his work place
as directed by a management representative, he went to the security office, used a Company phone and called the police emergency
No. 911 and requested an ambulance.

Subsequently, a police car

and ambulance came to the plant in response to that call.
Frankly I am unable to accept the grievant's explanation
for these actions.

He states that he did these things because

he needed immediate medical attention and was denied medical
assistance by the Company.

Neither the facts surrounding this

case nor the past practices of the Company support the grievant's
charge.
It is undisputed that the grievant has frequently requested medical attention of the Company and often asked to be taken

- 5 to a hospital in the Company's station wagon.
was his request denied„

On no occasion

Therefore I consider it unbelievable

that on May 12 the same Company representatives who previously
accorded him medical attention denied a similar reqiest.

The

grievant testified that during the early evening of May 12 he
fell and hit his head; and thought he was seriously injured.
(He testified that he thought his head was "split open").

He

stated that he appealed to Supervisor Graham for medical assistance.

Graham denies any such request by the grievant, asserting

that the grievant only complained that a fire door was blocked
by some pallets.

It seems to me that had the grievant been as

injured as he claimed it would have been apparent to Graham.
Under that circumstance, whether or not the grievant

expressly

asked for medical aid, I believe Graham would have provided
assistance as he and other representatives had done in the past.
And logically he would have especially done so if the grievant
had in fact requested aid.

Therefore I must conclude that the

grievant was neither so injured as to be in obvious need of medical attention, nor did he request medical assistance.
The frailty of the grievant's contention that he was injured and in need of medical treatment is further evidenced by his
trip to the fire department.

Had he been seriously or even

noticeably injured I doubt he would have been physically able
to go to and from the fire house as quickly as he claims.

Also

it is well known that fire houses have emergency medical equipment or are able to obtain emergency medical attention as needed.
Had the grievant been noticeably injured or had he been legitim^ately interested in obtaining medical treatment, it would have

- 6 been provided him or he could have obtained it at the fire house.
But he did not.

He admits that he went to the fire house not

for medical attention which he claims he so desperately needed,
but solely to report that a fire door at the plant was blocked.
In short that sole intention is totally inconsistent with his
claim that he was in need of emergency medical attention and
that his acts were solely designed to get medical aida

And

therefore that claim lacks credibility„
Considering the entire record before me I have no choice
but to conclude that the grievant disregarded instructions to
return to work; left the Company premises without permission;
called the police and summoned an ambulance, all for the purpose
of embarrassing the Company and disrupting its normal operations.
I find that the grievant's acts not only violated the above
stated rule, but were retaliatory in nature; apparently an outgrowth of what appears to be an unexplained hostility towards
the Company.

1 find these acts to be manifestly inconsistent

with a normal and expected employment relationship and contrary
to an employee's normal duty to orderly redress complaints
against his employer through the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract or in other adjudicatory forums.

The

grievant1s acts were unnecessary and possibly vengeful and therefore a termination of that employment relationship is justified.
Accordingly the grievant!s discharge was proper under the
terms of the contract.

Eric/Tf "Schmertz
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Public Utility Construction
and Gas Applicance Workers of
the State of New Jersey, Local
274, of the United Association
of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry, AFL-CIO, and the Public
Utility Gas Manufacturing Workers
of the State of New Jersey, Local
450, United Association of Journeymen and apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of
the United States and Canada,
AFL-CIO
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Public Service Electric and
Gas Company

S

I

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement effective May 2, 1967 between
Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Gas Production Department Central Division and Hudson Division, hereinafter
referred to as the "Company," and the Public Utility Construction and Gas Appliance Workers of the State of New Jersey,
Local 274, of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, AFL-CIO, and
the Public Utility Gas Manufacturing Workers of the State of
New Jersey, Local 450, United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the
United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as
the "Unions," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:

- 2 -

Under Article V Section 1 of the contract between
the Company and Local 450 and Article VI Section 1
of the contract between the Company and Local 274
should Independence Day, 1970 have been observed
as a holiday on Friday, July 3, 1970, or Saturday
July 4, 1970? If the latter to what remedy are
the affected employees entitled?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Newark, New
Jersey on November 18, 1970 at which time representatives of
the Unions and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
tor's oath.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitra-

Post hearing briefs were filed.

The pertinent contract clause is the same in both contracts.

It reads:

The following days shall be recognized as holidays:

(f) Independence Day

(or the days on which they are publicly observed).
Particularly significant, in my judgment, is the ending
phrase:
"or the days on which they are publicly observed."
Clearly, this means that the parties contemplated the
possibility that during the contract any of the enumerated holidays might be publicly celebrated on a day different from its
traditional calendar date.

Equally foreseeable was the fact

that a change in the public celebration of a holiday could be
brought about only by proclamation of an official or group,
authoritative in the public sector.

This of course includes

the Governor of the State of New Jersey.
I am persuaded that Governor Cahill's Executive Orders

- 3 numbered 6 and 7 declaring Friday, July 3, 1970 as the date
for the observance of Independence Day for State employees and
as a bank holiday, constituted a public observance of Independence Day, 1970 within the meaning of Article V and Article VI
Sections 1 of the respective contracts involved herein.
Accordingly the Unions1 grievance is denied.

I make the

following AWARD:
The observance of Independence Day, 1970 on Friday,
July 3, 1970 was proper under Article V Section 1
of the contract between the Company and Local 450
and Article VI Section 1 of the contract between
the Company and Local 274.

Eric ~J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 11, 1971
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this llth day of January, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY
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_

_

_

_
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In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702 Welfare Fund; Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians Union,
Local 702 Pension Fund
and
Radiant Laboratories, Incorporated

'
'
i
'
'
'
'

AWARD

'
i

i

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Agree
ment between the above named parties, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
For the period July through September 1971 Radiant
Laboratories owes the above named Pension Fund the
sum of $4932.10.
For the period June through September 1971 Radiant
Laboratories owes the above named Welfare Fund the
sum of $3222.93.
These sums are past due. Therefore Radiant Laboratories is directed to pay said sums to the respective
Funds forthwith0
Radiant Laboratories shall also reimburse the Funds
jointly in the amount of $150.00 representing/ the
Arbitrator's fee for services.
/-""V

Eric J/Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: November 1, 1971
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 1st day of November, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

PERMANS8T ARBXf&ATO!, MOT!®! PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES IHBUSfRT

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture laboratory Technicians
Union, Local 702 Welfare fuadf Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians tJnion,
Local 702 Pension Fund

A1AR©

and

Radiant Laboratories, Incorporated
The Undersigned aftPermanent Arbitrator under the Agree*
meat between the above named parties» and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
For the period July through September 1971 Radiant
Laboratories owes the above named pension fund the
sum of $4932.10.
For the period June through Septeaser 1971 Radiant
Laboratories owes the above nasaed Welfare Fund the
sum of $322?.93.
these sums are past due, therefore Radiant Laboratories is directed to pay said sums to the respective
Funds forthwith.
Radiant Laboratories shall also reimburse the Funds
jointly in theaaount of fl5d*H0 representing the
Arbitrator's fee for services.
Erie
Peroanent Arbitrator
Hovember 1, 1971
SIATE ®P Hew fork )88
CtKJHTf W Sew York) *
On this 1st day of Hoveaber, 1971, before me personally
eame and apfmared Erie J. Sehtaerts to me known and known to me
to be the individual described In and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to m& that he executed the sane.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

j-/

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Transport Workers of Philadelphia
and

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority

Award
of
Arbitrators

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award, as follows:
The claim of Mrs. Mary A. Lewis for a disability
pension under Section 705 of the contract is denied.

February 22, 1971

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

February

1971

Arthur W. Wilkens
Concurring

February

1971

Earl Kidd
Dissenting
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
, „ _
,_
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

,—f
'

Transport Workers of Philadelphia
and
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority

i
'
'
'
'
t

Opinion of
Chairman

The dispute involves the claim of Mrs. Mary A. Lewis for
a disability pension under Section 705 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
As I see it two conditions characterize an employee who
is permanently incapacitated within the meaning of Section 705
of the contract.

First he suffers from a medical disability

(either physical or mental) of a chronic, continuing and permanent nature; and second, because of that disability he is unable to perform or attend to his job with the Company on a minimal basis of skill and regularity.
The best evidence of the first condition is medical testimony and supporting medical documentation.

But the best evi-

dence of the second circumstance is not necessarily the view
of an attending physician, who is not familiar with the details
and requirements of the job involved, but rather the affected
employee's record of attendance and performance on that job.
Both sets of evidence are present in the instant case.
Based thereon I am persuaded that the grievant was not only
permanently disabled at the time of her discharge, but also on
and before that time was permanently incapacitated within the
meaning of that phrase in Section 705 of the contract.

- 2 But because these two conditions pre-dated the minimum of 15
years of service as required by Section 705; plus the undisputed fact that the Company has and may terminate permanently incapacitated employees before they have reached 15 years of service, the grievant is not eligible for a disability pension.
The record reveals, both in the form of medical documentation and through testimony of her personal physician, that as
early as October 1964 the grievant suffered from physical disabilities of a "permanent" nature.

The remaining question sim-

ply is whether so disabled, she was or was not permanently incapacitated from employment with the Company.
I am persuaded that her sparse attendance; indeed virtually non-attendance to her assigned job over an extended period
of time prior to her termination; including the period of time
immediately prior to her dismissal after she was given a "last
chance" to do simple "tripper work," is attributable to her
physical disability.

And that because that disability was per-

manent in nature, her inability to attend to her assigned jobs
on a regular basis meant that she was permanently incapacitated
from doing so.
To be eligible for disability pension under Section 705
of the contract an employee must be both permanently incapacitated and have achieved at least 15 years of service.

The

grievant met the first qualification but not the second and is
therefore not eligible.

Eric y. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
'
i
'

Local 445 IUE, AFL-CIO
and
Sperry Gyroscope Division and
Sperry Systems Management Division of
Sperry
_ _ _ _ Rand
_ _ _Corporation
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

'
'
'!

Award
and
Opinion

The stipulated issue is:
What was the agreed upon grievance settlement
which the Arbitrator directed the parties to
comply with in his Award of August 16, 1971?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on October 25,
1971 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
I find that initially the Company attempted to confine
the Union's grievance to four publication typists in the Gyro
Department.

However, I find that the Union made it clear to

the Company that its grievance covered publication typists in
three Departments, namely Gyro, Systems and the Training School.
I find that thereafter the agreement reached between authorized
representatives of the Union and Company covered those publication typists in all three Departments which the Union claimed
were performing bargaining unit work.

I find that the publica-

tion typists to which the Union was then referring were all
but a few publication typists then employed.
So that there is no further indefiniteness it is my ruling that the agreement reached between the parties in settlement of the Union's grievance was sufficiently broad to include

- 2the present eleven publication typists who are not now in the
bargaining unit.
Accordingly I make the following AWARD:
The agreed upon gtievance settlement which the
Arbitrator directed the parties to comply with in
his Award of August 16, 1971 covered all but a few
of the non-bargaining unit publication typists in
the Gyro, Systems, and Training School Departments
which the Union in April of 1970 claimed were performing bargaining unit work. I rule that the
agreement was sufficiently broad to cover the
eleven publication typists who at present are not
in the bargaining unit.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 1, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 1st day of November, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of th« Arbitration
445 tmt AFL-CX0
and
Sparry Gyroscope Division and

Avard

Opinion

Sparry- Systems Management Qivision of

Sparry land Corporation
The stipulated issue iss

What was the agreed upon grievance settlement
which tha .Arbitrator directed the parties to
coolly with in hi» Award of August l$t
A hearing was held at tha Company offices on October 25,
1971 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and ware afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and arguiaent and to examine and cross examine witnesses, The
Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
X find that initially the Company attempted to confine
the union1 s grievance to four publication typists in tha Gyro
Department. However, X find that tha' Onion made it clear to
the Company that its grievance covered publication typists in
three Departments, namely Gyro, Systems and the Training School.
X find that thereafter' tha agreement reached between authorized
representatives of the Union and Company covered those publication typists in all three Departments which the Onion claimed
were performing bargaining unit work. X find that the publication typists to which the Union was then referring were all
but a few publication typists then employed.
So that there is no further indefinitenass it is ay ruling that tha agreement reached between tha parties in settlement of the Onion's grievance was sufficiently broad to include

* 2*

the present eleven publication typist* who are not now in the
bargaining unit.
Accordingly I make the following AWARD*

The agreed upon grievance settlement which the
Arbitrator directed the parties to comply with lit
hie Award of August IS, 1971 covered all but a few
of the non-bargaining unit publication typists in
the $r#o, Systems, and. Training School Departments
which the l&ion in April ol 1970 claimed were per*
forming bargaining unit work* Z rule Chat the
agreement was sufficiently broad to cover the
eleven publication typists who at present a^e not
in the bargaining unit.

Erie. J7 Schmertz
Arbitrator
BATED: November 1, If71
I STATE Of Sew York )8g .
CQUHTY OF Hew York) *
On this 1st day of HOVM***, 1971, before me personally
earn® and appeared Erie J. Sehaertz to me known and .known -to me
to be the individual described in and who exeeutei the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 445 IUE, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Sperry Gyroscope Division and
Sperry Systems Management Division of
Sperry Rand Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Company's failure to implement an agreed upon
grievance settlement violates the contract. Therefore the Company violated the contract by assigning the disputed work to non-bargaining unit publications typists. The Company shall either cease
and desist from making such assignments or place
the non-bargaining unit employees assigned to that
work in the bargaining unit.

DATED:
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF
On this fi day of August, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 445 IUE, AFL-CIO
Opinion
Sperry Gyroscope Division and
Sperry Systems Management Division of
Sperry Rand Corporation

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Sperry Gyroscope Division and Sperry Systems Management Division of Sperry Rand
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Local 445 IUE, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Has the Company violated the contract by assigning
the disputed work to non-bargaining unit publications typists?
If so, it
cease and
place the
that work

is stipulated that the Company will either
desist from making such assignments, or
non-bargaining unit employees assigned to
in the bargaining unit.

A hearing was held at the Company offices on June 11, 1971
at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.
was expressly waived.

The Arbitrator's oath

The parties filed post hearing briefs

and the hearings were declared closed as of July 16, 1971.
I do not reach the merits of the issue because I am persuaded that the dispute was substantively settled between the

- 2 parties by representatives with authority to do so, prior to
the most recent contract negotiations.

I find the terms of

that settlement coincide with the relief the Union seeks in
this arbitration.
I do not find that that settlement was conditional or
contingent upon the completion of full contract negotiations;
nor was it subject to ratification by or during those negotiations.

Instead, the authorized representatives of the parties

agreed on the terms of the settlement leaving only mere formalization (presumably in writing) to the time when the contract
negotiations were to take place.

That the act of formalizing

what had previously been agreed to did not take place, does
not, in my judgment, vitiate the settlement.

I find nothing in

the contract requiring grievance settlements to be in writing;
nor, absent any specific contract requirement, do I know of
any rule which requires a grievance settlement to be reduced
to writing before it becomes binding on the parties.

On the

contrary, though a written settlement agreement is better evidence when the parties are in dispute over whether an agreement was reached, it is not a required condition of a settlement. And here the Union's testimony regarding the understanding reached by authorized representatives of the parties concerning the terms of the grievance settlement stands unrefuted
by the Company.
For the Company not to implement a grievance settlement,
either by failing to formalize what had been unconditionally
agreed to, or by failing to put the substantive terms of the

- 3settlement into effect, is violative of the intent of the
grievance procedure of the contract.
Accordingly the Company shall either cease and desist
from assigning the disputed work to non-bargaining unit publications typists or place those non-bargaining unit employees
assigned to that work in the bargaining unit.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 8-438, Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO
Award
and
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated November 19, 1969 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
Level 13 laboratory technicians in classifications
presently covered by the Agreement between the parties dated 1970-1973 headed "Laboratory Training
Program" are not entitled to 15£ an hour increase
effective October 1, 1969 under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Their grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 2, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 2nd day of August, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330 1002 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
r

Local 8-438, Oil, Chemical and
'
Atomic Workers International Union,'
AFL-CIO
'
'
and
'
i
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article VIII Section 3 Step 4 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 19, 1969 between
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Local 8-438, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue;
Are the Level 13 laboratory technicians in classifications presently covered by the agreement between the parties, dated 1970-1973, headed "Laboratory Training Program," entitled to 15£ an hour increase effective October 1, 1969 under the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
A hearing was held in New Brunswick, New Jersey on June 10,
1971 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
pressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The parties ex-

The hearings were de-

clared closed upon receipt of the stenographic record.
As I see it the question is not whether the laboratory
technicians are skilled tradesmen in the general occupational
sense, but rather whether those classifications are "skilled
trades" within the meaning of Section 13 of the Memorandum of

- 2 Agreement entered into in November, 1969.

That Section reads:

Skilled Trades
Effective October 1, 1969 employees in skilled
trades and their apprentice classifications will
receivea 15£ per hour trades differential.
I answer the contractual question in favor of the Company.
The pertinent documents including the Memorandum of Agreement
of November, 1969, the current Collective Bargaining Agreement,
and the Laboratory Training Program dated 1970-1973 persuade me
that the laboratory technicians in the classifications

involved

are not among the "skilled trades" covered by the foregoing provision.
There is no dispute that as of October 1, 1969 the laboratory technicians were not, under any circumstance, covered by
Section 13 of the Memorandum of November, 1969.

They had not,

by that date, completed the training program referred to in the
stipulated issue.

Following the Union's theory that they ac-

quired the prescribed skill upon completion of that program, they
had not yet qualified.

For that very reason it is also undis-

puted that the laboratory technicians were not deemed skilled
trades under the predecessor Collecti¥e Bargaining Agreements
between the parties.
Nor, even under the Union's theory could they be considered as part of the skilled trades at the time the current contract
was negotiated.

That contract, like the Memorandum of Agreement

referred to above, was negotiated and effective (as of November
19, 1969) four months before the first laboratory technician
graduated from the training program (in March, 1970).

- 3The issue therefore narrows to whether it was intended
by the parties that subsequently, after the affected laboratory technicians completed their training program, they would
within
fall/and be covered by Section 13 of the November, 1969 Memorandum of Agreement.

I find no such intent.

It is stipulated

that the training program was well under way when the current
Collective Agreement was negotiated.

Indeed, Article X Section

12 of the contract makes express reference to the specific type
of training program involved herein.

Therefore the parties

knew that sometime following the negotiation of the contract,
laboratory technicians would complete that training program.
It seems to me that had they intended the technicians to receive a 15£ an hour wage increase upon completion of the training program, some such provision would have been incorporated
in the new three year Collective Bargaining Agreement.
such provision was negotiated.

But no

On the contrary, the rate struct-

ure for the Level 13 technicians is specifically set forth in
Exhibit "A" of the contract, and there is no modification or
exception for completion of the training program which was then
in progress.

Significantly Article X of the contract express-

ly states that the classifications, descriptions and rate
ranges "shall remain unchanged for the duration of this Agreement."
Hence, as the contract makes no provision for an increase
of 15C an hour in the pay of the laboratory technician.:upon
completion of the training program, the Level 13 rate structure
for those classifications as set forth in Exhibit "A" must

- 4have been meant to remain unchanged throughout the term of the
contract, as mandated by the foregoing quoted section of Article
X.
On the other hand the contract does indicate how Section 13
of the Memorandum of Agreement of November, 1969 was to be applied.
The rate structure identifies those classifications within the
skilled trades to whom the 15£ an hour differential attaches.
Specifically they are the maintenance trades classifications, so
identified within Exhibit "A".

The laboratory technicians in-

volved in this case are not among them.
Also Section VIII (Wage and Training Time Structure) of
the Laboratory Training Program (1970-1973) sharply disputes
the Union's theory0

It seems to me that if the laboratory tech-

nicians were to enjoy the 15<£ an hour wage increase as a "skilled
trade" upon completion of the Laboratory Training Program, the
terms of that program would either so provide, or at least would
be silent on the wage the technician was then to receive.

But

Section VIII sets up a specific hourly rate of pay and a rate
structure applicable to "all classifications" covered by the
training program .... "upon successful completion of laboratory
training program time."

That language speaks for itself. And

as to the grievants in this case, those rates coincide with the
Level 13 Rate Structure set forth in the current contract.

Also

as in the contract, the rates of pay delineated in the Laboratory Training Program and applicable upon successful completion
of that program, do not include any provision for or even reference to a 15£ an hour trades differential.

- 5 The Department of Labor diplomas, certificates, and other
documents relating to the "skill" which the laboratory technician gains following completion of the Laboratory Training Program relate, in my judgment, to what I said at the outset was not
the question in this case - namely the general occupational skill
of the classifications involved.

However these documents are

not germaine to the contractual question at issue.
For all the foregoing reasons I hold that the Level 13
laboratory technicians involved in the instant case did not become a "skilled trade" within the meaning of the contract upon
completion of the Laboratory Training Program; and accordingly
their claim for a 15<? an hour trades differential wage increase
is denied.

Uric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

7 / -i-v

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 2352, American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
Award
and
U0 S 0 Army Watervliet Arsenal

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named Parties and dated June 24, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The grievance of Mr. Louie Andersen dated
April 29, 1970 is not arbitrable.

Eric 0- Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May
1971
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this f I day of May, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same0

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 2352, American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
U.S. Army Watervliet Arsenal

In accordance with Chapter VI Section E, Sub-Section (2)
of the Agreement dated June 24, 1970 between U.S. Army Watervliet Arsenal, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer" and
Local 2352, American Federation of Government Employees, AFLCIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned
was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the grievance of Mr. Louie Andersen dated
April 29, 1970 arbitrable?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer in Watervliet, New York on March 24, 1971 at which time Mr. Andersen,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the Union and Employer, hereinafter referred to collectively
as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

Post hearing briefs were filed and the hearings declared closed
as of April 27, 1971.
On first, but superficial impression, the grievance would
appear to be arbitrable.

The grievance protests the manner in

which the Employer handled certain Suggestions filed by the

- 2grievant under Army Regulation AR 672-20 (Incentive Awards).
In its entirety the grievance reads:
I, the undersigned, wish to file a grievance against
the rejection of Suggestions #67-010-1230 and 67005-1228 for the following reasons;
1. The above suggestions were adopted and used.
2. Watervliet Arsenal Route Sheets, DWG. E683927
and E679829 were changed to incorporate the
basic concept of my suggestions.
3. Several changes reflected increased working
time whereas in the areas covered by my
suggestions there has been a reduction in
working time estimate.
4. The alterations made on R.S0 E679829 reflect
neither the actual time used nor the method of
operation. The exception being Lathe V/S shaper.
5. Operation #100 with regard to the old method
was the prime reason that additional time was
needed to machine the first 175MM Navy Cannon.
6. If the new R.S0 is followed (E679829) additional time has been lost since operation 90 and
60 should have been done on one set up to be
followed by operation #70.
7. The estimated time of 100 hours stated for
Operation #90 is also in error since it takes
only 16 hours for each set (I.D. & O.D.) or a
total of 32 hours.
8. In the reevaluation and second rejection of
my suggestion it was thoroughly explained that
my process created a condition that might generate a rejection report of major significance.
However, it is an undeniable/indisputable fact
that this same unacceptable suggestion was incorporated into the revised route sheet. This
in turn confirms my belief that these rejections
were made on a personal basis rather than the
validity of the suggestions.
(Signed) Mr. Louie Andersen
72-01512
Clearly by title and substance Army Regulation AR 672-20
meets the definition of "any regulations, policies or procedures issued by higher headquarters" within the meaning of
Type I Section (C) of the grievance procedure of the contract.,
The pertinent parts of that Section read;

- 3 Section C Applicability
(a) This procedure shall extend only to an
employee's dissatisfaction over specific
instances of the application and interpretation of the Agreement and situations
considered Type I, II or III grievance
under CPR E-2 including dissatisfactions.
1. Type I - Over specific instances of the interpretation or application of any regulations, policies or procedures issued by
higher headquarters.
There can be no doubt that the grievance represents a
dissatisfaction with the application of a regulation issued
by higher headquarters.

On that basis, irrespective of the

merits of the claims raised in the grievance, the grievance
would appear to be procedurally arbitrable„
Also sub-Paragraph (b) of Section C sets forth certain
enumerated exclusions from the Type I, II and III grievances,
which may not be grieved under the contract.

And that list

does not include any reference to grievances arising from the
Suggestion or Incentive Award Plan.
However, none of the foregoing takes into account the
express provisions of Article 4 Section C sub-Paragraph (a)
of the contract which reads:
Section C Controlling Directives
a. In the administration of all matters covered by
the Agreement, officials and employees are governed by the provisions of any existing or future laws
and regulations, including policies set forth in the
Federal Personnel Manual and Department of Army Regulations (including authoritative interpretations
and rulings from government organizations that exercise control over the EMPLOYER) which may be applicable, and the Agreement shall at all times be
applied subject to such laws, regulations and
policies.

- 4I am satisfied that the immediate foregoing contract section by its specific application to the "administration of all
matters covered by the Agreement ...." (emphasis added) overrides any contract provision which may be construed to the contrary and preempts any provision of the contract which may be
inconsistent with "any existing or future laws and regulations
including policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual
and Department of Army Regulations ...."

In short under the

negotiated language of Article 4 Section C (a), policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel Manual shall obtain, any different or contrary provisions of the Agreement

notwithstanding.

Applicable to the instant dispute is part 771 of the Federal Personnel Manual, and specifically Section 771.302 (Grievance Coverage).

The pertinent part of that Section reads:

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of
this section, this sub-part applies to any matter
of concern or dissatisfaction to an employee which
is subject to the control of agency management.
(b) This subject does not apply to;
6. Nonadoption of a suggestion or disapproval of
quality salary increases, performance award, or
other kind of honorary or discretionary award;
(underscoring supplied).
Thus, Section 771.302 of the Federal Personnel Manual excludes from grievance coverage, nonadoption of a suggestion.
And Article 4 Section C (a) of the Agreement endows the Federal Personnel Manual with preemptive authority over "all matters governed by the Agreement."

In my judgment the instant

grievance which protests the "rejection of Suggestions Nos.
67-010-1230 and 67-005-1228" is a complaint over"nonadoption"
within the meaning of Section 771.302 of the Federal Personnel

- 5 Manual, because obviously, it protests the failure of the Employer to adopt the suggestions and to accord credit for them
in a manner satisfactory to the grievant.
The Union contends that the foregoing interpretation of
Section 771.302 (b (6) is negated by Section 771.311 which prohibits a negotiated grievance procedure from including only
those matters set forth in (1 through 3) of Section 771.302;
and that because the "nonadoption of a suggestion" is found
in #(6), the Federal Personnel Manual does not oust such disputes from arbitration under the contractual grievance procedure.

I do not read Section 771.311 (c) that way.

Rather I

interpret it to mean that the Bnployer and the Union are prohibited from including any express provision in a negotiated
grievance procedure which makes grievable or arbitrable the
matters set forth in 1 through 3 of Section 771.302 but are
permitted to explicitly include the other enumerated items.
In other words, the other enumerated items of Section 771.302
including item (6) (Nonadoption of a suggestion), may be grievable or arbitrable if the negotiated grievance procedure provides, by express language or reference, for their inclusion.
But inclusion cannot be implied or inferred.for an express prohibition can only be negated or changed by express language
setting forth the inclusion.

Under the Agreement between the
f
parties hereto, there is no express provision which includes
grievances arising from the Suggestion or Incentive Award Plan
within the grievance or arbitration procedures.

Had the parties

negotiated such a specific reference, such action would have

- 6 been permitted under Section 771.311 (c) of the Personnel Manual.

But absent such contractual inclusion, the express pro-

visions of Section 771.302 (b), especially the exclusion of
disputes over "nonadoption of suggestions':' remain binding on
the parties, and therefore exclusions from the grievance procedure are not limited to Section C (b).
In short, under Section 771.311 (c) the Union and the Employer may specifically provide for coverage under negotiated
grievance and arbitration provisions of those excluded items of
Section 771.302 (b) except items 1 through 3.

But absent a

clear and express inclusion within a negotiated grievance procedure including item (6), the prohibitions of Section 771.302
remain.

Under the instant Agreement which does not contain an

explicit inclusion of item #6, I find those prohibitions still
in force, as required by the application of Article 4 Section C
(a) of the Agreement0
Accordingly I must conclude that the grievance is not arbitrable.
The disposition of the issue before me does not require
that I determine what alternative remedies if any, the grievant
may have, nor the substantive effect of his receipt of a monetary award in connection with his suggestions.

Therefore, my

decision on the question of arbitrability is without prejudice
to the rights of the Employer, the grievant and/or the Union in
some other forum or on appeal under the appeal provisions of the
Incentive Awards and Suggestion Plan.

Eric A. Schmertz /
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Chemicals & Crafts Union, Inc.
and

Award

Union Carbide Corporation,
Chemicals & Plastics Operations
Division

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated May 9, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award, as
follows:
L. The Company has not established that Ralph
Montrey is physically unable to perform his
job duties. Therefore the termination of
Ralph Montrey on February 10, 1971 was improper. Mr. Montrey shall be reinstated to
his job as Maintenance Mechanic in Building
No. 105.
2. Mr. Montrey is denied back pay.
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Eric
J.'Schmertz
Chairman
John J. Dacey
Concurring in No. 1 above
Dissenting from No. 2 above

Brian Murray
Dissenting from No. 1 above
Concurring in No. 2 above

-

DATED: July 1^1971
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)38
On this VV' day of July, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Case No. 71 A/7331
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
!

Chemicals & Crafts Union, Inc.

'
!

and

'
1

Union Carbide Corporation,
Chemicals & Plastics Operations
Division

Opinion of
Chairman

'
'
'

In accordance with Article IX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 9, 1970 between Union Carbide Corporation, Chemicals & Plastics Operations Division, hereinafter
referred to as the "Company," and Chemicals & Crafts Union, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to
hear and decide, together with the Union and Company designees
to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the Contract when it
terminated Ralph Montrey on February 10, 1971?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
Messrs. John J. Dacey and Brian Murray served respectively
as the Union and Company Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held in New Brunswick, New Jersey, on June
28, 1971, at which time Mr. Montrey, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties waived

the Arbitrators' oath and filed post hearing briefs.

The Board

of Arbitration met in executive session on July 16, 1971.
Based on a Workmen's Compensation case between the grievand and the Company, the testimony elicited therein, the de-

- 2 cision of the Compensation Judge and a subsequent analysis of
that case by the Company's physician and supervisory personnel,
the Company decided that the grievant was physically unable to
perform his duties as a Maintenance Mechanic.

The Workmen's

Compensation hearing took place on September 24, October 15 and
November 5, 1970.

The decision of the Compensation Judge was

rendered on November 6, 1970.

The grievant was disqualified

from employment and terminated on February 10, 1971.
To come right to the point - I am not satisfied that standing alone, this Workmen's Compensation case is determinative of
the grievant's physical ability to perform his duties as a
Maintenance Mechanic in Building No.105, where he worked prior
to termination.

Something more is necessary - a connection be-

tween the disability determined by the Workmen's Compensation
Board and the grievant's performance on the job; or a connection as to how the conditions of the job affect the disability.
It is these connections which the Company failed to make in this
arbitration.

Specifically in my judgment, this Workmen's Com-

pensation decision is persuasive in support of the Company's decision only if the Company is able to demonstrate that the grievant has been performing his job duties inadequately or unsatisfactorily because of the disability; or that the job conditions
involved have aggravated or would potentially aggravate his disability.

If the former is shown, the grievant's termination

would be proper because of a demonstrated inability to perform
his job duties.

His termination would also be proper if the

latter circumstance was shown because to continue him on the

- 3 job would unreasonably risk his physical well being and place
the Company in a position of unwarranted liability.

But neith-

er of these essential circumstances are shown by the Workmen's
Compensation decision.

The decision is limited to a finding of

a pulminary disability of 45%, occupationally connected.

It

does not determine whether or not the grievant, with that disability, is physically capable of performing the job duties
from which he was terminated.

In short, a Workmen's Compensa-

tion decision of disability is not a fortiori, a finding that
the employee is unable to continue at work.
The best evidence is how the employee has been performing
his job, and the job duties as they relate to his particular
disability.

The record before me discloses that since the

grievant's transfer in February, 1967, from Building No.41
(a "dirty" building where chemical fumes are highly prevalent)
to Building No.105 (the second "cleanest" building of the Company's installation), the grievant has performed all the duties
assigned to him as a Maintenance Mechanic without complaint by
or about him.

In other words though he suffered from a pulmin-

ary disability, that disability did not impede his satisfactory
performance of work assigned to him.

What limitations were

placed on his assignments (such as to overtime, lifting and exposure to fumes) were voluntarily accorded him by the Company
as early as 1967, and as thus accepted by the Company,cannot
now be pointed to as evidence of his inability to work. Though
the Company decided as a result of the Workmen's Compensation
proceeding, that the grievant could not tolerate the heavy
lifting and climbing of stairs attendant to the Maintenance

- 4Mechanic's duties, the hard evidence is to the contrary.

For

the last four years, during which the grievant suffered from
the pulminary disability, he has done that work apparently to
the Company's satisfaction.

So, though the Workmen's Compensa-

tion case disclosed a significant pulminary disability, occupationally incurred, the Company has not adduced evidence inthis
arbitration showing that because of that disability, the grievant has been unable to perform his job duties.
Also, the Company concluded, based again on the Workmen's
Compensation case, that the grievant should no longer be exposed to chemical fumes, gases and other dust and dirt.
As previously indicated that judgment would be sound if
the level of fumes, gases and dirt, etc. had or would potentially aggravate or compound the grievant's disability.

But the

record does not disclose either that circumstance or potentiality.

Building No. 105 is relatively free of the offending fumes

and gases.

Medical evidence in the record before me indicates

that during the grievant's four years of work in Building No.105
his pulminary condition had at least stabilized if not improved.
This means that the level of fumes and gases to which he was exposed as well as the other working conditions were not of sufficient intensity or quantity to aggravate his disability; nor after
the passage of four years can it be said that the potential for
aggravation is reasonably present.
The Company relies heavily on the grievant's testimony at
the Workmen's Compensation hearing inwhich he expressed certain
difficulties in performing his job as Maintenance Mechanic in
- Building No.105 - (specifically "extreme shortness of breath"

- 5 when climbing stairs or lifting heavy objects) as an admission
against interest with regard to his physical ability to perform
his job.

Again, such testimony at a Workmen's Compensation

hearing, when juxtaposed with four years of satisfactory work
performance, including climbing of stairs and the handling of
some heavy work, cannot, absent other proof, be interpreted as
fatal to the grievant's case in arbitration.

Frankly, when com-

pared with his testimony in this arbitration, it is my conclusion that what the grievant said at the Workmen's Compensation
hearing was exaggerated if not misleading.

If so, the Company's

remedy was to impeach that testimony at that hearing with evidence of the grievant's job performance, or to appeal the Compensation decision.

But termination solely because of exagger-

ated or misleading testimony at the Workmen's Compensation hearing, albeit reprehensible, is not the appropriate penalty, simply because, absent other evidence supporting the Company's
contentions, it is not sufficient proof that the grievant is
physically unable to perform his job duties.
In some respect, however, the Workmen's compensation hearing and decision is relevant to this arbitration. Because the
decision appears to establish a pulminary disability of 45%
either incurred or aggravated by the grievant's work in Building No.41 prior to February, 1967, it establishes the fact, at
least in my judgment, that the grievant is disqualified from
again working in Building No.41 or any other building with a
comparable level of chemical fumes, gases, dust and dirt.

In

this regard there is no doubt that had the grievant been still
_ employed in Building No.41 or a comparable building when the

- 6 Workmen's Compensation decision was rendered, the Company action
in terminating him would have been proper.

Clearly, based on

that decision, the conditions in Building No.41 had something to
do with the grievant's disability.

And it would be reasonable to

conclude that continued exposure to the conditions in that building would aggravate his disability, and unreasonably increase
the Company's further insurance liability.

For, aside from the

grievant's testimony referred to above, the Workmen's Compensation decision relates to a disability originally incurred prior
to 1967 and to a building in which he worked prior to that date.
But it did not deal with the conditions present in Building No.
105, to which the Company in 1967 had transferred the grievant
because of the pulminary disability, a condition which the Company knew of at that time.(Though the full magnitude of it was
not judicially determined until the Compensation Case of 1970.)
So as an accommodation to his disability, the Company removed
the grievant from the very work conditions which apparently were
responsible for or aggravated the disability covered by the subsequent Workmen's Compensation case.

Hence that case cannot be

used as a standard to judge the effect of a different set of
working conditions (in Building No. 105) on the grievant's
known disability.
For the foregoing reasons I find that the Company has failed to establish proper grounds for the grievant's termination.
As to remedy, the Workmen's Compensation case is also germaine.
cretion.

The stipulated issue gives me flexibility and disI think what triggered this case in large part was

the grievant's exaggerated if not misleading testimony at the

- 7 Workmen's Compensation hearing.

In the face of his testimony

that heavy lifting and climbing of stairs produced extreme
shortness of breath or caused him to "gasp for breath" it is
understandable why the Company felt that to continue him on
his job would be too much of a risk for both of them.

In short,

the grievant is partially but significantly responsible for the
position in which the Company placed him.

Though I -find the

Company erred in terminating him, the grievant must bear some
of the blame for what transpired.

As such, a remedy which

makes him totally whole is not justified.
I direct his reinstatement to his job as a Maintenance
Mechanic in Building No.105, but as a reflection of his share
of the blame, that reinstatement shall be without back pay.

^x
Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD

Local 376 UAW
and
Whitnon Manufacturing

Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 19, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARDS, as
follows:
The layoffs during the week of November 16 and
from November 23 to December 2 did not fall within the provisions of Section 11.10 of the contract.
Therefore the Company erred when it staggered layoffs of two groups of three employees each for
periods of five days, without considering the
order of seniority of the affected employees.
The layoffs should have been based on seniority
and ability as required by Sections 11.02 and
11.03 of the contract. Those senior grievants
who were laid off from the Lathe Department while
other employees with less seniority continued at
work on jobs which the senior laid off employees
could perform, shall be made whole for the time
lost.
In considering which employees possessed the least
seniority, Mr. Ron Carubba should be included. At
the time of the layoffs involved,Mr. Carubba was
either a probationary employee or a member of the
bargaining unit with less seniority than any of the
grievants.

^C**W*ui
Eric Jl. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

May

1971

STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 376 UAW

OPINION

and
Whitnon Manufacturing Company

In accordance with Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 19, 1970 between the Whitnon Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and Local 376 UAW hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the contract when, during
the week of November 16, 1970, it laid off Walter
Golas, John Buczkowski and Peter Tricarico; and
when from November 23 to December 2, 1970 it laid
off Sal Aparo, Juan Valcarce and Joseph Zelazko?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Farmington,
Connecticut on April 26, 1971, at which time representatives
of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "Parties" appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

oath.
The six employees referred to in the stipulated issue
worked in the Lathe Department.

There is no dispute that three

of them were laid off during the five working days of the week
of November 16; and the other three during the five working
days between November 23 and December 7; and that the two

- 2 "staggered" layoffs were scheduled and effectuated without
considering the seniority of the employees involved.
The Company concedes that among the three employees laid
off in each of the two periods involved were those with greater seniority than other employees who were permitted to work
during that period and whose jobs the senior laid off employee(s)
could have performed.
The Union contends that this arrangement for two periods
of "staggered" layoffs was violative of Article XI (Seniority)
and particularly the sub-sections thereunder which provide for
layoffs based on "seniority and ability."
The Company takes the position that the layoffs involved
were of a "temporary" nature and involved circumstances covered by Section 11.10 of Article XI of the contract.
The Company contends that under that Section, which reads:
Whenever temporary lay-offs are necessary due to
conditions beyond the control of the Company which
curtails production, such lay-offs will be made by
the Company in accordance with operational requirements and need not be made in order of seniority. Recalls from such lay-offs will be made on
the basis of operational requirements. In no event
will the temporary lay-off exceed five (5) working
days unless an extension is mutually agreed to by
the parties to this Agreement,
the disputed layoffs, which did not in each instance exceed
five days were proper without considering the "order of seniority" of the affected employees.
I am not satisfied that Section 11.10 was intended to
cover the instant factual situation.

It is clear that a tem-

porary layoff as defined by Section 11.10, is one which does
not exceed five working days (unless extended by mutual agree-

- 3 merit of the parties, a factor not present in this case).
Perforce that means that a layoff of more than five days duration must be covered by the other provisions of Article XI,
particularly Sections 11.02 and 11.03, which mandate the laying off of employees by seniority (provided those that remain
possess the ability to perform the remaining work; also a factor not in dispute in this case).
Whether or not "beyond the control of the Company" within
the meaning of Section 11.10, I am not persuaded that the layoffs necessitated by the undisputed substantial fall off of
work in the Lathe Department, were limited to five days.
it is

Rather

apparent to me that the duration of the layoff in the

Lathe Department was ten working days for three employees of
that Department.

In other words the quantity of available work

required three less employees for ten days.

I am not satisfied

that the Company's theory of staggering the ten layoff days
amongst two groups of three employees for five days in each instance, transforms ten days of reduced work into two separate
temporary layoffs of five days each.

Indeed if the Company's

theory prevailed, layoffs of extended duration could be handled
on a staggered basis by laying off portions of the work force
for five days or less, rotationally, without any regard for seniority.

Thereby, the seniority provisions of Sections 11.02

and 11.03 could be circumvented in all instances and thus reduced to a nullity.

I am convinced that Section 11.10 was neith-

er intended nor negotiated for that purpose.
This is not to suggest that the Company had the latter pur^pose in mind.

On the contrary, I am sure the Company merely

- 4 wished to act equitably, and to share the available but reduced quantity of work among the total work force in the Lathe
Department.

But whether equitable or commendable, it was

nonetheless inconsistent with Sections 11.02 and 11.03 of the
contract and not within the exception set forth in Section 11.10.
Accordingly, the Company's action in laying off two groups
of employees in the Lathe Department for five days each, over
a total of ten days, without regard for seniority of those
laid off, was violative of the Company„

The Company should

have laid off the three junior employees of the Lathe Department for the total ten days involved, permitting them to exercise what rights they may have had in accordance with their
seniority to bump into other jobs which they could perform.
In considering which employees possessed the least seniority, the Company should have included Mr. Ron Carubba. Based on
the record I find that during the periods of the layoffs referred to in the stipulated issue, Mr. Carubba was either a probationary employee or at best, a member of the bargaining unit
with less seniority than any of the six employees laid off.
Those senior grievants who were laid off while others with
less seniority worked at jobs which the laid off employee had
the ability to perform, shall be compensated for the time lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

